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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by defendant, U.S. Energy Corp., 
demonstrates that the court of appeals decision conflicts with prior decisions of this 
Court in approving an award of punitive damages without any finding of tort liability, 
without a prior finding of punitive damage liability, and despite unlawful introduction of 
wealth evidence. (Pet. 6-13.) The court of appeals decision also departs from prior cases 
of this Court by awarding attorney fees for all of plaintiffs' claims, without any reduction 
or apportionment for unsuccessful claims or claims unrelated to U.S. Energy's 
counterclaim, which was found to be the sole basis for the fee award. (Pet. 13-16.) 
Plaintiffs' opposition brief fails to address the specific points established in the 
petition, focusing instead on marshaling of evidence and waiver arguments that are 
unrelated to the issues presented. The purpose of this Reply Brief is to focus the Court 
back on the issues presented, and to demonstrate more specifically how the court of 
appeals decision on punitive damages and attorney fees conflicts with prior decisions of 
this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION CONFLICTS WITH 
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT REGARDING ESSENTIAL 
CONDITIONS FOR AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Plaintiffs attempt to divert attention from the issues actually raised by U.S. Energy 
in its petition to this Court. (Opp. Br. 7-9.) U.S. Energy does not here challenge any 
jury instruction or the sufficiency of evidence to support the verdict. Rather, the issues 
raised on this petition arc purely legal: 1) Can punitive damages be awarded in the 
absence of any tort liability? 2) Can punitive damages be awarded without any prior 
finding of punitive damage liability; i.e., a finding, regardless of sufficiency of evidence, 
that U.S. Energy engaged in willful and malicious conduct? 3) Can punitive damages be 
awarded when illegal wealth evidence was introduced, even without objection, during 
the compensatory damage phase of the trial? On those legal issues, marshaling of 
evidence is irrelevant.1 
As more fully set forth in the petition, those issues were decided contrary to this 
Court's prior decisions, or present matters of first impression. The court of appeals 
sidestepped the first issue, affirming the verdict of punitive damages while conceding 
that it was "unable to determine," and had "no way of knowing," whether the verdict was 
based on tort or contract. 383 U.A.R. at 11, *\\ 19, and 12,1f 25. That ruling squarely 
conflicts with this Court's decision in Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 
1167 (Utah 1983), holding that a "verdict for punitive damages cannot be sustained 
[when] the record does not show an award of compensatory damages in tort to which 
such punitive damages could be ascribed." (Emp. added.) Plaintiffs make no effort to 
distinguish the Warnick case or its undisputed statement of the law. 
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the real issues by arguing that "the bulk" of the court of appeals 
opinion dealt with the marshaling requirement and waiver. (Opp. Br. 6.) However, that is not accurate. 
In a minor, secondary argument to the court of appeals, U.S. Energy asserted the absence of any evidence 
to support an award of punitive damages. That argument rendered marshaling of evidence unnecessary 
because nonexistent evidence cannot be "marshaled." The court of appeals' ruling on that argument is 
immaterial because U.S. Energy has abandoned that argument for purposes of its petition to this Court. 
The marshaling argument pertains only to sufficiency of evidence; marshaling of evidence has nothing to 
do with the issues raised here, such as the absence of any tort basis for punitive damages at all. 
On the second issue, plaintiffs simply parrot the court of appeals ruling that 
punitive damages can be awarded without a prior finding of punitive damage liability 
when the defendant does not '^object to the procedure." (Opp. Br. 8-9.) See 383 U.A.R. 
at 10, U 15. However, we are talking about more than mere procedure. U.C.A. § 78-18-1 
absolutely prohibits an award of punitive damages without a prior finding of punitive 
conduct, established by clear and convincing evidence. This Court has never addressed 
the issue of whether that statutory mandate can be waived, presenting here an issue of 
first impression. This Court has authority to review a manifest violation of statute, even 
though not raised in the trial court. (Pet. 11.) Moreover, the court of appeals' 
characterization of the issue as one of mere procedure contradicts this Court's holding in 
Cook Associates, Inc. v. War nick, supra, which places "the burden of requesting special 
verdicts" squarely on the plaintiff. 664 P.2d at 1168. It is the plaintiffs, here, who had 
the obligation to establish punitive liability in the first verdict form. That waiver, by 
plaintiffs, cannot be excused by a perceived waiver in the second verdict form when the 
jury should never have received a second verdict form.2 
The third issue is one of first impression: Can the statutory mandate of section 
78-18-1(2), absolutely prohibiting wealth evidence during the compensatory damage 
phase of trial, be waived by inadvertent failure to object? Case law in analogous 
2
 The court of appeals decision also conflicts with Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 
P.2d 789, 807 (Utah 1991), and other cases that expressly require bifurcated consideration of punitive 
damages and, thereby, implicitly preclude consideration of punitive damages without a prior finding of 
punitive liability. The court of appeals merely "assumed" a finding of punitive liability from the verdict 
of punitive damages. 383 U.A.R. at 10, If 16. However, such a procedure simply "skips" the essential 
finding of liability, contrary to the law established by this Court. 
contexts indicates that it cannot be waived. This Court can review the issue pursuant to 
Rule 103(d), permitting review of "plain error." 
POINT II: THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION AWARDING 
UNRESTRICTED ATTORNEY FEES IS CONTRARY TO THIS 
COURT'S PRIOR DECISIONS. 
Assuming, for purposes of this argument, that plaintiffs are entitled to some 
attorney fees under the lease agreement, the court of appeals decision awarding plaintiffs 
all their fees for aU_ work on all_claims and defenses is plainly contrary to this Court's 
prior decisions. As set forth in the petition, in a case involving multiple contract and tort 
claims and counterclaims, the party requesting fees must allocate fees among the various 
claims and between successful and unsuccessful claims. (Pet. 13-14.) Plaintiffs made no 
allocation. The court of appeals nonetheless awarded all fees on the basis that plaintiffs 
prevailed on defendant's contract counterclaim alone. 383 U.A.R. at 11, f^ 20. 
This decision is plainly contrary to this Court's prior decisions in Cottonwood 
Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992); Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 
1998); and Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998), which all require a 
claimant to apportion requested fees among contract and noncontract claims, and 
successful and unsuccessful claims. Absent such an apportionment, the trial court, or a 
reviewing court, has no way of knowing whether the fee amount requested is reasonable. 
See Foote, supra, at 55 ("Even a cursory look at counsel's affidavit reveals counsel's 
failure to properly categorize the fee request and raises questions about the 
reasonableness of the fees . . . .''); Valcarce, supra, at 318 O'trial court. . . may not award 
wholesale all attorney fees requested if they have not been allocated as to separate 
claims"). 
Here, plaintiffs' award should have been limited to the fees actually related to 
prevailing on defendant's counterclaim. For example, plaintiffs' tort claims for fraud 
and infliction of emotional distress are unrelated to defendant's counterclaim for an 
accounting of receipts and expenditures. Plaintiffs should not be awarded unlimited 
attorney fees for a multitude of contract and tort claims and defenses when the actual 
basis for the verdict cannot be determined, and the only basis for fees is the contract 
counterclaim. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should grant the petition for writ of certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted this /& day of March, 2000. 
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